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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Respondent,
11-

,,J,1YNt:

Case No. 19053

STERLING PEARSON
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Wayne Sterling Pearson, was charged by
information with violations of the following provisions of
Utah Code Ann.

( 1953), as amended:

76-4-201, conspiracy to

commit attempted burglary, attempted robbery, and attempted
theft;

76-4-101 and

§

76-6-202, attempted burglary:

76-4-101 and

§

76-6-301, attempted robbery;

76-4-101 and

§

76-6-404, attempted theft.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Third
Judicial District, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding.

The

only charges sent to the jury for determination were attempted
burglary and attempted robbery.

Appellant was convicted of

those charges and sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison
of not more than 5 years for each offense, the sentence to run

concurrently with the sentence already beinq served fnr
another offense.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPF:AL
Respondent seeks an order affirrninq the

judqm•·nt

,.f

the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of October 15, l'lfll. two juveniles,
Brian Moss and Tony Sisneros, skipped school and headed for
the corner of 15th South and 4th F:ast, where they were to meet
someone for the purpose of engaging in a burglary and/or
robbery,

( R.

577, 590-593).

There they were picked up by

Robert Smith, a co-defendant of appellant's, who had
approached Brian Moss several weeks earlier about
participating in a robbery involving money and jewelry
(R. 982-988, 595-597). Moss had discussed the arrangement with
his friend, Sisneros, who then agreed to participate in the
planned robbery (R. 592).
After being picked up by Smith, the boys were driven
to a gas station at 5th East and 21st South, where they were
joined by appellant.

During the ensuing conversation among

the four, appellant asked the boys i f they needed gloves.

He

then went to his car and returned with a roll of duct tape and
gloves (R.

599-600, 1003-1004).
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The four individuals left the gas station in Smith's
,·.11

anrl ,Jrove

•J''neral

'""'',

to Moss's home.

conversation concerning the robbery and the need for a
l\pparently, Moss was to find something at his home that

he> userl as a mask.
«/l<>»

During the ride, there was some

One of the adults told him that a

st0cking would be sufficient (R. 600-602).
When Moss rejoined the group after a brief stop at

his house, appellant said he needed to stop at his brother's
apartment at 28th South and 2nd East.

During the drive, there

was more general conversation about the robbery
(R. 1014-1016).

At the apartment, appellant left the group

for a few minutes.

While appellant was gone, Smith told the

hoys where to look and what to look for in the house they
intended to burglarize.

He also told the boys that if any

trouble arose, apparently from the presence of the intended
victim, they were to use the tape provided by appellant to
secure the victims hands and feet.

The gloves were to be used

to avoid leaving fingerprints (R. 1017-1020).
After rejoining the others in the car, appellant
asked if Smith had explained what the boys were to do.

He

then showed the boys a cap pistol which he said they were to
use (R. 1022-1023).

After this exchange, the car pulled away

from the apartment, proceeding only a short distance down the
street before it was stopped by a South Salt Lake Police
officer (R. 1024).
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While waiting to be questioned by the rulire, Mw;c,
observed appellant shoving something into a fan grate locaterl
in the latter's holding cell.

Pol ire

suhscqL1r>nt 1 y

from the grate a business ca rel upon which th0 nam0 an,1

dcl i 1 ,

of the intenclecl victim were written (R.
Appellant's prints were founcl on that carcl (R.
although neither of them knew the name of the

37fl).

Finally,

intenclecl victim,

Sisneros testified that they were to rob the home of an olcler
woman (R.

611, 641-643).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT OF ATTEMPTED BURGLARY AND
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY.
The issue in the present case concerns the
interpretation of Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann.
76-4-101 ( 1953), which provides in pertinent part:
(1)
For purposes of this part a
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2)
For the purposes of this part,
conduct does not constitute a substantial
step unless it is stongly corroborative of
the actor's intent to commit the offense.
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1\ppcl lnnt

argues that his conduct did not constitute a

,;tthstantial step toward the commission of the offenses of
11

tc-111pted burglary and attemptec'l robbery.
Utah's attempt statute is an adaptation of the Model
''"!

c,

r'odc"s c'lefinition of attempt.

s.ol.

See Model Penal Code

Thus, it is important to focus on interpretations

given to Model Penal Code-type statutes, and not to rely
heavily on common law distinctions between attempts and mere
preparation, as appellant c'loes.

Common law definitions of

criminal behavior are not applicable in Utah, and where there
is a conflict between the common law and this state's criminal
code, the statutes are to be construed liberally.

State v.

Maestas, Utah, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (1982).
The Moc'lel Penal Code's attempt statute was motivated
by considerations of prevention.

The drafters saw the need

for a compromise position between the punishment of any
suspect behavior and the curtailment of police action until
the substantive crime had been committed.

Their treatment of

attempt was seen as "drawing the line further away from the
final act," making the crime more one of purpose substantiated
by an act strongly corroborative of that purpose.
Code§ 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).

Moc'lel Penal

The emphasis is on

what the actor has already done and not what remains to be
done.

Misner, "The New Attempt Laws:

unsuspected Threat to

the Fourth Amendment," 33 Stan. L. Rev. 201, 211 (1981).
Actions which likely would fall on the preparation side under

-5-

the common law could easily estahlish an att<e>mpt und<>r the
Model Penal Code:

e.g., the gathering of

to commit

a crime, or the possession of certain instrum<•r1ts viith tt"·
intent to use them in the commission of a hurglary.
211,

Iri •

at_

221.

Thus, for purposes of attempt under Utah's statute,
analysis must focus less on the nature of the defendant's
activity standing alone and more upon whether that activity
substantiates the intent to commit a crime.

The hehavior nee

not be incompatible with innocence; it need only be necessary
to the consummation of the crime and such that a reasonable
observer, looking at the behavior in context, could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken with the
purpose of violating the law.

United States v. Manley, 632

F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1980).
Whether conduct represents a substantial
step toward the fulfillment of a criminal
design is a determination so dependent on
the factual context of each case that, of
necessity, there can be no litmus test to
guide the reviewing courts.
Manley, 632 F.2d at 988.

The actual dividing line between

preparation and perpetration (i.e., the determination of when
an actor's conduct no longer constitutes preparation and
becomes a substantial step toward the commission of the
offense) is far from clear.

Therefore, a review of several

cases construing statutes following the Model Penal Code

-6-

formc1t

will be helpful in determining whether appellant's

"duct constituted a substantial step toward the commission
''''Jlary and robbery.l
In State v. Workman, 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d 382
the defendant had spent the evening drinking at a bar

(I

with some friends.

On the way home, he and a friend decided

to hold up a gas station.

They parked in an alley behind the

gas station and took a gun from the trunk.

They also had a

q un ny sack and stocking cap to be used as masks,

hid in some bushes.

They then

At about 2:30 a.m., the gas station

attendant decided to take a brief stroll.

He caught sight of

one of the defendants behind the phone booth.
became suspicious and called the police.

The attendant

About this time the

defendant and his friend decided not to continue, although
they were unaware that the police had been called.

As they

were abandoning their hiding place, the police arrested them.
The court sustained an attempted robbery conviction
and held that a substantial step differed from the concept of
an overt act in that it need only corroborate the actor's
intent.

Where the preparation ended and the attempt began was

held to be a determination for the trier of fact based on the
facts and circumstances of the individual case.

The court

It should be noted that some courts construing Model Penal
Code-type statutes have reached rather extreme results on
the question of what constitutes a substantial step.
Compare Braham v. State, Alaska, 571 P.2d 631 (1977), with
People v. Clerk, 68 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 386 N.E. 2d 630
( 19 79).
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stated that this standard was nirecterl to the rlef0ndant 's
actions, which demonstrated a firm purpose to commit a crimA.
This also allowed the police to intPrvenc lo prevent

a crirrir

when there was incriminating conrluct.
United States v. Jackson, 415 F.Supp 411 IF.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd 560 F.2rl 112, cert. denied 434 U.S.

941 (1977),

involved an interpretation of an attempt statute requiring th,
same elements as the Utah statute.
into a conspiracy to rob a bank.

The defenrlant hacl entered
The consrirators assemblea

sawed-off shotgun, shells, masks and handcuffs.

They also

covered their car's licence plates with cardboard.

The plan

called for the conspirators to arrive at the bank early
morning so they could enter with the bank manager anc1 relieve
him of the weekend deposits.

They arrived too late to effect

this plan and postponed the attempt for a week.

In the

meantime, one of the conspirators was arrested on an
charge and told the police of the robbery plan.
The following Monday, the defendants clrove up and
down the street in front of the bank several times.

One of

the group left the car, looked into the bank and then rejoined
the group in the car.

They macle several more passes in front

of the bank, but after becoming suspicious that they were
under surveillance, clecidec1 to abanclon the plan.
driving away, they were pursued by the police and
susbseguently arrested for attempted bank robbery.

-8-

While

The court found that gathering the materials for the
, nrn<nission of the crime, recruiting people to assist, and
ri<iq
l
-.j>eCl

the license plates with cardboard were all

'111tial

steps which constituted an attempt.

f ical ly rejected

The court

the argument that the defendant had to

near completion of the bank robbery.

Nor was it necessary

that there be any substantial progress toward that end.

Any

en•leavor which was corroborative of the actor's intent was
sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for attempt.
"The fact that further major steps must be taken before the
crime can be completed does not preclude a finding that the
steps already taken are substantial."

435 F. Supp. at 438.

As demonstrated by the cited authority and case law,
the essence of an attempt is the existence of an intent to
commit a crime, coupled with conduct strongly corroborative of
that intent.

Once the intent has been established, even

slight acts that corroborate that intent constitute a
substantial step.

State v. Dale, Ariz., 590 P.2d 1379 (1979).

Appellant does not contend that he lacked the intent to commit
a burglary and/or robbery.

His appeal is based solely on the

sufficiency of his actions to constitute a substantial step.
Accordingly, the inquiry is limited to whether his conduct was
strongly corroborative of his intent.
The trier of fact determines what constitutes a
step.

State v. Workman, 584 P.2d at 386.

It is

established that an appellate court will only overturn a
ve nl ict challenged on insufficiency of the evidence "when the
-9-

evidence is so lacking and

insubstantial

that a rea.snnable man

could not possibly have reached a verclicl lH;ynnd ci rc>,1 sonah!
doubt."

State v. Mccardle, Utah, liS2 P.2cl 'l4/,'l4S (l'lfl2l.

is the exclusive function of the jury to weiqh lhe credihi 1 i•.
of the witnesses and

the weight of tlH' evirlencP; that an

appellate court might view the evidence cis less than wholly
conclusive is not sufficient to overturn a verdict on appeal,
state v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982).
As the evidence at trial demonstrated, appellant
provided the duct tape and gloves which co-defendant Smith
explained to the juveniles, Moss and Sisneros, were to be
to commit the burglary and/or robbery;

the duct tape to tie

ue

the victim, if necessary, and the gloves to avoid leaving
fingerprints.

Appellant also provided the cap pistol for use

in the crime.

Finally, appellant was stopped by the police in

a vehicle containing his co-defendant Smith, the two juveniles
recruited to participate in the burglary and/or robbery, and
items to be used in the commission of the crime.

Just like

the conduct in Workman, 58 4 P. 2d 38 2 (at tempted rob he ry of a
gas station), and in Jackson, 435 F. Supp. 434 (attempted bani
robbery), appellant's conduct was sufficient to constitute a
substantial step and support his conviction for attempted
burglary and robbery.

Certainly,

the evinence was not so

lacking ann insubstantial that the jury could not conclune
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had taken a
substantial step toward the commission of the crimes chargen.
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CONCLUSION
This appeal requires an interpretation of UCA

r. 4-101 (1953).

The statute should be analyzed by the

of the Model Penal Code requiring a substantial step
anrl not the common law distinctions between preparation and
attempt.

A substantial step requires only that the actor's

conrluct be strongly corroborative of his intent as determined
by the circumstances of the case.

The focus is not upon what

has or has not been accomplished toward the commission of the
offense, but on whether the actions corroborate intent
Zickefoose v. State, Indiana, 388 N.E.2d 507 (1979).
Appellant intended to participate in a burglary
and/or robbery and his actions were designed to achieve that
purpose.

In short, his conduct constituted a substantial step

and thus his conviction should be sustained.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of November,

1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
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